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This paper investigates the impact of changes in earnings disregards for welfare assistance received
by single mothers following welfare reform in 1996.  Some states adopted much higher earnings disregards
(women could work full time and still receive welfare), while other states did not. We explore the
effect of these changes on women's labor supply and income using several data sources and multiple
estimation strategies.  Our results indicate these changes had little effect on labor supply or income.
 We show this is because few women used these earnings disregards.  This is surprising and we discuss















I.  Introduction 
  The welfare reforms enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1996 gave states substantial 
leeway to design cash assistance programs for low income and predominantly female-
headed families with children.  States used this discretion to implement a wide variety of 
changes in their welfare programs.  One change made by many states was to disregard a 
higher share of the earnings of working women in calculating their eligibility for welfare 
benefits.  Higher earnings disregards are typically viewed as equivalent to reduced tax 
rates, leading to an increase in the effective wage rate.  In general, economic theory 
would predict such a change should induce greater labor supply among low-wage 
workers.  Furthermore, even in the absence of any labor supply effects, higher earnings 
disregards should increase income among workers by allowing them to receive more 
welfare benefits at a given level of earnings.  
  States that adopted higher disregards in the mid-1990s used these arguments, 
claiming that they would increase work incentives, thereby reinforcing other program 
changes also designed to push welfare recipients into employment, as well as supplement 
the income of single mothers as they left welfare and entered work.  In many states, these 
changes in earnings disregards were large, with reductions in the implicit tax on earnings 
of 50 percentage points or more.  Despite a large literature that evaluates the effects of 
welfare reform
1, we are not aware of previous research that focuses on the effects of these 
benefit disregard changes.  This paper investigates whether enhanced benefit disregards 
produced increases in labor supply and also investigates their effects on income.   
  Despite very large differences in earnings disregards across states, our results 
suggest that states with higher disregards do not show substantially larger increases in 
                                                 




labor supply among low-skilled single mothers.  This is true whether we look at labor 
force participation or hours of work.  Even more surprising, we find no income 
supplementation effect from these disregards.  This is puzzling, since higher disregard 
states should be providing greater subsidies to low-wage women as they enter work.  We 
verify these results across several data sets and multiple specifications.  Why should this 
be true?  Our data suggest that very few working women in high disregard states appear 
to take advantage of earnings disregards to receive ongoing income supplements from 
welfare; instead they leave welfare entirely once they are working.   We discuss a number 
of reasons why women might choose to forego ongoing support from the public 
assistance system that high earnings disregards could provide. 
The next section discusses the changes that occurred in the mid-1990s in more 
detail.  The third section reviews the literature on changes in behavior and well-being 
among single mothers in response to welfare program incentives.  The fourth section 
describes the comparative patterns in the data over time among states that raised their 
earnings disregards and those that didn’t, using both graphical and difference-in-
difference comparisons.  The fifth section provides a more parameterized test of these 
effects.  The sixth section looks at reasons why the effects of these earnings disregards 
are so small.  The final section concludes.   
 
II.  Earnings Disregards and Labor Supply Incentives  
  The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was the primary 
cash welfare program in this country prior to the 1996 welfare reforms.  It provides the 




look at the changes implemented following the 1996 welfare reforms that abolished 
AFDC and gave states the authority to design their own cash welfare programs. 
The AFDC program provided a maximum benefit level, or benefit guarantee (G), 
to those who did not work.  As women went to work, earnings disregards determined the 
amount of earnings that was ignored in the ongoing calculation of welfare benefits, and 
hence determined how quickly income rose with earnings by determining how rapidly 
benefit reductions offset earnings increases.  Under AFDC, earnings were disregarded 
entirely in the calculation of benefits for an initial period up to a certain earnings level; 
we will refer to this as the initial earnings disregard (IED).  This initial AFDC earnings 
disregard included a mandatory $30 in earnings each month, but (at state discretion) 
could also include disregards related to child care expenses and other work expenses.   
When earnings exceeded this disregard, benefits were reduced at a rate t (0≤ t ≤1), 
which we will refer to as the benefit reduction rate (BRR).  Earnings are disregarded in 
the calculation of benefits at a rate of 1-t; that is, for each hour worked at wage w, income 
rises by (1-t)w, while the remainder is lost through an offsetting reduction in welfare 
benefits.  We use the umbrella term “earnings disregards” to refer to both the initial (100 
percent) earnings disregard as well as the more graduated earnings disregards built into 
the benefit reduction rate. 
Figure 1 depicts the budget constraint that results from this program design.  A 
non-worker receives G, the maximum benefit level.  A woman who begins to work at 
wage w will see her income rise dollar for dollar as her earnings increase, until the initial 
earnings disregard, IED, is exhausted (point A on figure 1).  Beyond this point, income 




earnings.  At point B, known as the break-even point, benefits have been reduced to zero.  
Beyond B, income rises again dollar-for-dollar with earnings (ignoring the effects of 
other tax or transfer programs.) 
  Under the AFDC program, states determined the maximum state benefit level, G, 
leading to widely varying benefit levels across states.
2  After 1967, however, the federal 
government enacted national rules for earnings disregards that all states were required to 
follow.  Table 1 shows how the earnings disregard rules changed over time under AFDC 
starting in 1979.   Federal rules about earnings disregards tightened after 1981, with caps 
on state-determined child care and work expense disregards.  A gross income cap on 
eligibility was also imposed, which prevented anyone from receiving welfare whose 
income exceeded 150 percent of the state need standard.
3   In states where the break-even 
point is higher than the income cap, this creates a notch in the budget constraint.   
By the early 1990s, when welfare reform was enacted, women on welfare who 
went to work received a standard $30 initial earnings disregard and were potentially 
eligible for further disregards depending on their child care and work expenses.  Once 
these initial disregards were exhausted, they faced a benefit reduction rate of 67 percent, 
which rose to 100 percent after four months of work.  This implies that three key 
parameters are important in understanding benefit payout and (by implication) labor 
supply incentives in AFDC
4:  the benefit level G, the benefit reduction rate t, and the 
                                                 
2 For instance, in January 1990 the lowest benefit state paid $118/month, while the highest benefit state 
paid $846/month, with a median of $364 in monthly benefits. 
3 State need standards were correlated with but not always identical to their benefit guarantees.  Like the 
benefit guarantees, they varied substantially across states. 
4 In fact, incentives are more complicated than described here, as states vary in the manner in which they 
apply these four parameters to calculate benefits.  For more information on the detailed formulae used by 




initial earnings disregard amount IED.  A fourth parameter, an income or earnings cap 
beyond which welfare could not be received, was also important in some circumstances.   
  In general, increases in earnings disregards, either through increases in the IED or 
decreases in the BRR, should increase hours worked among non-workers or low-hours 
workers.  This effect is indicated on Figure 1 by arrows 1 and 2.  On the other hand, as 
the break-even point increases, more people who are at or near the old breakeven point 
may find it beneficial to reduce their hours.  This is indicated on Figure 1 by arrows 3 and 
4.  The net effect is theoretically ambiguous, and depends upon the magnitude of the 
labor supply responses among non-workers versus workers near the breakeven point.   
Similar arguments suggest that increased earnings disregards should result in increased 
income for nearly all workers, except those who decrease their hours significantly from 
above the break-even point B.   
  Note that there is similar ambiguity if one asks about the effect of earnings 
disregards on income levels.  If the dominant effect is to increase labor supply among 
non- or low-hours workers, then these disregards should raise income; but if the effect is 
to reduce hours among workers who would otherwise be off welfare, then the income 
effect is negative.  In the welfare reform era, when all the emphasis was on moving 
people off welfare and into work, the 50 percent decline in caseloads suggests that few 
persons reduced work to receive welfare; in this situation, one would expect expanded 
income disregards to raise the income of women, allowing them to continue to receive 
some income supplements as they enter work.  Of course, if the push to leave welfare 




  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
abolished the AFDC program and replaced it with a federal block grant to the states, 
known as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant.
5  Under 
TANF, federal rules about benefit reductions were abolished and states could now 
determine these parameters in any way they wished.  
The result was enormous state variation in the design of TANF-funded welfare 
plans by the late 1990s.  Different states made very different choices about a range of 
new program options, including work requirements, time limits on benefits, sanctions 
(punishments for those who didn’t comply with the new rules),  and a variety of 
eligibility restrictions.  States also chose very different earnings disregard policies, with 
variation in the initial earnings disregards they provided, in their benefit reduction rates 
and in the gross income caps that they imposed.  In short, all four parameters became 
state-specific.  Further state variation occurred because states also allowed these 
parameters to change in differing ways over time as a women’s employment spell 
lengthened.  In some states, earnings disregards and benefit reduction rates were set at 
one level in the first few months after a women entered employment, changed again 
within six months of employment, and changed again after 12 months of employment.   
Table 2 provides a quick snapshot of how earnings disregards changed over the 
1990s across the states, showing earnings disregards at months 1 and 6 in 1990, 1995 and 
2000.  All states were subject to uniform AFDC rules in 1990; by 1995 a few states were 
                                                 
5 Blank (2002) and Grogger and Karoly (2005) describe the 1996 welfare reform and summarize research 




deviating from AFDC requirements.
 6  By 2000, four years after welfare reform, states 
were all over the map in their earnings disregard rules, from 0 to 100 percent. 
To provide a concrete example of this state diversity, let us describe the programs 
in Florida, Illinois, and Texas.   Figure 2a shows the income constraint facing a low-wage 
single mother in Florida in 1990 and 2000 who entered work from welfare and is in her 
sixth month of work with a wage of $7/hour.
7  In 1990, the initial earnings disregard 
allowed her to earn $120 before her benefits were reduced dollar-for-dollar with earnings.  
She hit the breakeven point at $595 of monthly earnings (85 hours of work at $7/hour).  
Essentially, if she worked more than 20 hours/week in 1990, she was no longer eligible 
for welfare.  By 2000, Florida had raised its initial earnings disregard to $200, and 
lowered its benefit reduction rate to 50 percent.  The breakeven point was now $1190.  At 
$7/hour of earnings, this woman had to work 170 hours/month (over 40 hours/week) 
before she lost her welfare eligibility.  Clearly, by 2000 there were stronger incentives for 
non-workers and low-hours workers to increase employment and a substantial benefit 
subsidy to low-wage work. 
In contrast, the changes in Illinois’ income constraints were more ambiguous.  
Figure 2b plots the 1990 and 2000 income constraint facing this same woman in her sixth 
month of work in Illinois at $7/hour in wages.  Her budget constraint in 1990 under 
AFDC was identical to that in Florida, except that Illinois’ monthly guarantee G was 
$367, $73 higher than in Florida.  This shifts up the entire budget constraint but does not 
change its shape.  By 2000, Illinois eliminated all initial earnings disregards, but had 
                                                 
6 Some states were granted federal waivers, allowing them to alter their AFDC program.  Michigan and 
California were the first to do this in 1993; a total of 6 states changed their disregard policies before 1996. 
7 Because we want to emphasize the changes in earnings disregard parameters, we ignore inflation 
adjustments in Figures 2a to 2c.  In reality, benefit guarantee levels eroded due to inflation in most states 




enacted a lower benefit reduction rate of 66 percent.  As a result, women who were not 
working had less incentive to enter the labor market and work only a few hours; but they 
had a greater incentive to work more hours.  The breakeven point expanded to $1155 
(165 hours/month at $7/hour, or about 40 hours/week), and many more women who left 
welfare to work in low-wage and part-time jobs would have received subsidies.  
Finally, Figure 2c shows that the state of Texas made very few changes after the 
1996 reforms.  The income constraint facing this same woman is identical in 1990 and 
2000 in Texas, with only a very slight change in the guarantee rate.   Eight states 
essentially kept the AFDC rules post-1996; some other states made only small changes. 
Table 3 summarizes how the variation across states widens between 1990 (when 
all states ran AFDC programs) and 2000.   The first six columns show the total welfare 
benefits paid to a welfare recipient who is in her first, sixth, and thirteenth month of 
employment in 1990 and 2000.  We assume this woman earns $7/hour and works 30 
hours/week.  The variation in 1990 comes from variation in state benefit levels and 
federal variation in earning disregard rules (see Table 1).    The variation in 2000 comes 
from state variation in benefit levels and earnings disregards. 
Table 3 shows that welfare benefits for working welfare recipients are much more 
extensive for women in 2000 compared to 1990.  In some states the welfare payments 
available during the first month of work is actually lower in 2000.  This is because the 
initial earnings disregards were quite high under AFDC for a woman with child care and 
work expenses, and because there was inflation erosion in the guarantee level in most 
states between 1990 and 2000.  But the continuing subsidy to work after the first few 




Table 3 also indicates that the variation across states in benefits available to a 
woman leaving welfare and working for a year rises significantly after welfare reform.   
We calculate what we call the “expected income gain from work” in each state for 1990 
and 2000, which is affected by both benefit levels and earnings disregard rules.  We first 
calculate the difference between total income received during each of the first 12 months 
of work at a given number of work hours for a woman earning $7/hour, minus what she 
would receive if she did not work during these twelve months (essentially, the guarantee 
level in the state since we assume no other income sources than work and welfare.)  If 
there were no earnings disregards, this calculation would simply be her total earnings 
minus the annual benefit maximum; the greater the earnings disregard, the higher is 
estimated income since earnings are supplemented by welfare benefits.  We do this 
calculation for each month at 25, 30, 35, and 40 hours of work.  
The last column in Table 3 shows the difference in the expected income gain from 
work at 30 hours/week in 2000 versus 1990 (all of these numbers are adjusted for 
inflation and expressed in 2000 dollars.)  This is an estimate of how the incentive to enter 
work has changed, largely due to changes in earnings disregards.
8   It is clear in Table 3 
that the income benefits to work have risen substantially in a number of states.  At the 
maximum, women in Connecticut can expect to earn $5132 more in 2000 during their 
first 12 months of work at 30 hours/week than they did in 1990.   Fourteen states show 
income gains of more than $2000.  Relative to annual pre-tax earnings of about $10,500 
(1500 hours times $7/hr) these gains are substantial. 
                                                 
8 These calculations are also affected by changes in benefit guarantee levels.  Most states, however, made 
relatively minor changes in benefits over this decade; most of the benefit changes are due to inflation 
erosion.  Because we subtract benefit levels from potential earnings (that is, we calculate the incentive to 
work by estimating the difference between work income and non-work income), pure inflation effects that 




To calculate a broad measure of the state increase in work incentives due to 
expanded earnings disregards, we average the difference in the expected income gains 
from the first 12 months of work at 25, 30, 35, and 40 hours of work for each state.  
Based on these calculations, we define three groups of states.  “Low-change” states are 
the fifteen states that have the lowest changes in their average expected income gain to 
work between 1990 and 2000, based on our calculations.  These are largely states that 
made little change in their earnings disregards after the 1996 reforms.
9  The net gain to 
work in these states (averaged across the four hours categories) varies from -$648 (NM) 
to $477 (GA).  “High-change” states are the fifteen states with the largest changes in 
average expected income gain to work between 1990 and 2000; their average gains vary 
from $1842 (NV) to $5757 (CT).  These are states that significantly increased their initial 
earnings disregard and/or significantly decreased their benefit reduction rates.
10  The 
remaining 21 states are designated as middle-change states.  (The District of Columbia is 
included, so we have 51 ‘states.’)  The middle category includes states like Illinois, 
whose earnings disregard changes might increase work subsidies for some hour/wage 
combinations and decrease them for others.   
We show the evolution in the amount of welfare benefits available to workers in 
these three groups of states from 1984 through 2003 in Figures 3a and 3b.  Figure 3a 
graphs the trends in real yearly benefits from welfare in the first year after a welfare 
recipient (a single mother with two children) goes to work for 30 hours/week at $7/hour 
(assumed constant in real terms over the period).  The thick solid line shows average real 
                                                 
9 These states include AL, AR, AZ, CO, GA, KY, MD, MS, NM, NY, OR, PA, SC, SD, VA.  Note that this 
is a mix of states from all parts of the country. 
10 These states include AK, CT, DC, DE, HA, IA, MA, MO, NV, NH, NJ, ND, OH, RI, WI.  Again, this is 




yearly benefits in the high-change states.  As expected, there is a sharp increase in the 
ongoing average welfare benefits available to a working welfare recipient after 1995 in 
these states, after a decade of little change.  In contrast, there is very little increase in the 
middle-change states (thin solid line) or low-change states (dotted line).
11   
One’s initial reaction might be that the strongest comparison is between the high-
change and the low-change states.  But note that from the standpoint of drawing 
inferences about the effects of changes in earnings disregard policies, Figure 3a suggests 
that the better comparison might be between high- and middle-change states.  These two 
states show identical trends in earnings disregards prior to 1994 (the differences in 
amounts are largely due to higher benefit levels in high-change states, which lead to 
higher benefits at 30 hours of work.)  By the year 2000, however, women working 30 
hours per week in high-change states were eligible to receive almost $2,000 more per 
year than similar women in middle-change states.  Low-change states have lower benefits 
available to a 30-hour-per-week worker throughout this period, and the trends are 
somewhat different.  
Figure 3b shows the same plot for a woman who enters work from welfare, but 
works 40 hours per week.  The differences across states are even sharper in this plot.  
Indeed, our high-change states are almost all states whose earnings disregards have 
increased so much that they subsidize full-time work for at least some period after 
women leave welfare.  There is very little subsidy to full-time work after 1995 in either 
the middle-change or the low-change states.
12    
                                                 
11 The lines in Figures 3a and 3b are not population weighted; every state counts the same in the group 
averages.  Creating group averages that are population weighted by states produces the same conclusions. 
12 One might object to characterizing work incentives by the total amount of cash welfare a woman might 




Figures 3a and 3b indicate that the returns to work for women in high-change 
states increased much more than those facing women in middle-change or low-change 
states.  The comparisons across these groups of states will be key to our analysis of 
whether or not these state changes actually increased work behavior.  Before turning to 
that analysis, however, we summarize the prior literature on the expected effects of 
income disregards on labor supply. 
 
III. Literature on the Labor Supply and Income Effects of Welfare Program Design 
  Changes in benefit disregards are typically viewed as equivalent to changes in tax 
rates.  An extensive literature has investigated the elasticity of labor supply to changes in 
wage and tax rates.
13  Heckman (1993) summarizes this literature by noting that labor 
supply elasticities appear to be quite low for those already working; that is, the impact of 
changes in wages on hours of work among workers is small.  Most of the elasticity of 
labor supply appears to occur on the extensive margin; that is, the decision to participate 
in work or not.  This is true for both male and female labor supply, although the 
responsiveness of female labor supply is greater.
14  Most of this literature, however, 
focuses on the responses of men and married women, while we are interested in female 
household heads with children.  
Four different U.S. public assistance programs have been used to study the 
specific question of how earnings disregards affect labor supply among single mothers:  
                                                                                                                                                 
understand the complicated set of rules for benefit determination.  However, if we focus only on welfare 
benefits available to women in their first month of work—information that is likely communicated by local 
welfare offices—the trends across the three groups of states are nearly identical.  Furthermore, given the 
large number of women leaving welfare in the mid-1990s, we would expect that approximate information 
about the availability of ongoing benefits would become known within low-income neighborhoods. 
13 For instance, see Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) or Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). 
14 As Heckman notes, male labor supply responsiveness appears to have increased as men’s overall 




the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program; the experimental 
Negative Income Tax programs run in the 1970s; the experimental “waiver programs” 
run in the early and mid 1990s by some states; and the Earned income Tax Credit. 
The early AFDC-based literature is summarized in Danziger, Haveman and 
Plotnick (1981), who conclude that there are big differences in the estimated effect of the 
benefit reduction rates in different studies, and that the estimates seem very sensitive to 
specification and data definitions.
15  Moffitt (1992, 2002) provides a more updated 
summary of this literature and concludes that the labor supply of female heads is 
remarkably inelastic, with little response to major changes in benefit levels, benefit 
reduction rates, and labor market opportunities.  In his specific discussion of benefit 
reduction rates, Moffitt concludes that the increase in labor supply induced by lower 
benefit reduction rates among welfare recipients is offset by the decrease in labor supply 
among workers near the break-even point.  Note that this conclusion is a judgment, 
however, with regard to AFDC.  In most of these studies there is no separate estimate of 
these effects; only an aggregate impact is estimated.  Hence, one cannot tell from this 
research whether the impact of lower benefit reductions rates on labor supply behavior is 
non-existent, or whether there are positive and negative effects that cancel each other out. 
The Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments that operated in the 1970s were 
designed to explicitly test the behavioral and income effects of varying levels of G and t.  
Burtless (1986) concludes that lower benefit reduction rates appear to create positive 
work incentives for welfare recipients who are not working.  The net effect in the total 
                                                 
15 This is perhaps not surprising since the federal government imposed a standard benefit reduction rate 
across states.  State differences arose from differences in initial earnings disregards for child care and work 
expenses, but the data on these were extremely limited.  As a result, there was no agreed-upon way of 
calculating effective earnings disregards and different studies take different approaches.  In comparison, 




low-income population is slightly lower work incentives, however, suggesting that the 
negative work incentives among those near the break-even point must also be significant.   
The welfare-to-work experiments run by the states in the early 1990s also 
included changes in earnings disregard policies.  States received waivers from the Federal 
government that allowed them to offer alternative programs to AFDC with stronger work 
incentives.  The Federal government required that states evaluate these programs with a 
rigorous random assignment design.  In most cases, this meant that a “bundle” of reforms 
(mandatory welfare-to-work, time limits, changes in benefit disregards, etc) was 
compared to the old AFDC program, making it difficult to separate out the impact of any 
one of these reforms alone.  Hence, although virtually all of these experiments resulted in 
increases in labor supply and reductions in welfare utilization, it is hard to say how much 
of this might be due to the lower benefit reduction rate.   
The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) had a more complex 
experimental design that allowed separate evaluation of the mandatory welfare-to-work 
program and the lower benefit reduction rate (Miller, et. al., 2000).  The results indicated 
that the lower BRR appears to have had little labor supply effect.  The increase in labor 
supply seems to have come almost entirely from the mandatory welfare-to-work program 
and its associated sanctions.  The lower BRR did provide substantial wage subsidies to 
those workers who left welfare, however, and significantly increased their incomes and 
lowered poverty rates.  A review of a large number of these experimental state programs 
(Bloom and Michalopolous, 2001) indicates results consistent with MFIP.  Programs with 




greater declines in poverty, but appeared to have no greater labor supply effects than 
programs that included only mandatory welfare-to-work requirements. 
In contrast, the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), which operated in the 
mid-1990s, seemed to suggest that financial incentives could both increase labor supply 
and reduce poverty.  SPP was a randomized controlled trial study of an earnings 
supplement given to full-time workers who had been on welfare for over one year.  
Relative to a control group, a program group offered a subsidy equal to about CA$10,000 
per year in 1992 had about 15 percent higher labor force participation while receiving the 
subsidy, as well as significantly lower poverty rates (Michalopoulos, et al, 2002).  This is 
(very roughly) a bit more than $8,000 in US-2000 dollars, or about 4 times the average 
difference between income gains in high and low-change states.  This suggests that very 
large financial incentives can induce work, although the labor supply (and income) 
effects faded very quickly after the subsidy ended.   
The expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provided an alternative 
opportunity to study the impact of changes in implicit marginal tax rates among single 
mothers in the 1990s.  The EITC increases the implicit wage for non-workers as they 
enter the labor market, which should increase the labor force participation incentive for 
non-workers.  But the subsidy is capped at a maximum amount over a range of hours, and 
then phases out; this should reduce labor supply among higher earners.  Between 1990 
and 2000 the EITC expanded substantially.  For instance, the initial wage subsidy 
increased from 14 percent to 34 percent (40 percent for mothers of two or more children), 
while the maximum credit more than doubled and the phase-out rate increased from 10 




mothers, the evidence indicates a significant positive effect of the EITC expansions on 
labor force participation.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) estimate that 60 percent of the 
increase in female labor supply between 1984 and 1996 was due to EITC expansion.  
There seems to be little effect on hours among those already working.
16  Hence, in 
comparison to the AFDC/NIT literature, the EITC literature shows a clearer net positive 
effect on labor supply among female household heads, with strong initial participation 
effects and few offsetting declines in labor supply among higher earners.
17  Of course, the 
EITC operates through the tax system.  Given the difficulty in understanding changing 
marginal tax rates within the tax system, it is perhaps not surprising that women who are 
already working do not respond to the higher marginal tax rates from the EITC; it is not 
clear that they understand them.   
In summary, the early evidence from the NIT experiments and from early AFDC 
studies show mixed (but generally small) effects of earnings disregards on labor supply.  
This is consistent with the experimental evidence on actual earnings disregard changes in 
state waiver programs from the early-1990s that show few labor supply effects.  In 
contrast, the SSP and EITC evidence suggests that sizeable earnings subsidies can induce 
significant labor supply effects.   
The impact of earnings disregards on poverty has generally received less attention 
than their impact on labor supply.   Perhaps surprisingly, there is little research on the 
impact of AFDC on overall income levels.  Some results from the Negative Income Tax 
suggest that housing and educational outcomes improved among NIT recipients 
(Hanushek, 1986).  The experimental studies of state waiver programs in the 1990s (cited 
                                                 
16 A simulation in Meyer (2002) confirms these results.  Eissa and Liebman (1996) show similar results.  
17 In contrast, married women’s labor supply seems negatively affected by the EITC, as one might expect 




above) provide the strongest evidence that greater earnings disregards can have positive 
income effects and negative poverty effects.  The tax subsidies in the EITC also appear to 
produce income and poverty benefits.  The Council of Economic Advisors (2000) 
estimated that the EITC removed 4.3 million persons from poverty in 1998.
18 
In all, this literature suggests that the large increases in state earnings disregards 
following welfare reform might not have very large effects on labor supply, but should 
help increase income.  To our knowledge, there are no studies that focus on the impact of 
these state earnings disregard changes.   The next two sections investigate this question.  
 
IV.  A Simple Investigation of the Effect of Earnings Disregards on Labor Supply 
and Income 
   In this section, we perform some simple tests of whether low-skilled single 
mothers in the states that substantially increased earnings disregards showed larger 
increases in labor supply or income.  In the next section we undertake regressions to test 
the impact of changing earnings disregards in a more structured estimation process. 
A.  The Data 
  We utilize three sources of data in this research and describe them briefly here.  A 
Data Appendix provides more detailed information on data sources and variable 
definitions.  First, we start by looking at the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The ORG data includes information from all 
persons in their fourth and eighth interview months (one fourth of the CPS is in the ORG 
each month).  By aggregating this data across all months we have quite large annual 
samples, even when selected by gender and skill level.  For instance, in the 1990 data 
                                                 




there are 3709 single mothers with less than a high school degree.  In the 2000 data there 
are 2322 such women.  We use ORG data from 1984 through 2003. 
  The ORG contains information on current workforce participation and hours of 
work.  It has no information on income or public assistance usage, however.  We 
supplement the ORG with the March CPS data.  A special supplemental survey each 
March asks CPS respondents about their income sources in the previous year.  (Hence we 
use data from the 1985-2004 March CPS to get information on calendar years 1984-
2003.
19)  Because this comes from only one month’s CPS sample, the sample sizes are 
much smaller.  For instance, in the 1990 data there are 1572 less-skilled single mothers, 
while there are 991 in 2000. 
Finally, to test the robustness of our results with an alternative source of data, we 
use information from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  The SIPP 
is a longitudinal data set, which selects a panel of respondents and collects monthly 
information (based on interviews every four months) from them for an extended period of 
time.  We use data from the 9 SIPP panels that were launched in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001.  These lasted from 24 months (1988 panel) to 52 
months (1996 panel).  The longitudinal nature of this data set lets us look at behavioral 
changes for the same woman over time in our econometric estimation in the next section.  
The data include both labor market and income information.  We have SIPP data from 
1986 through 2003, with sample sizes for less-skilled single mothers ranging from 947 
                                                 
19 The labor market information we use from the CPS is based on questions about labor force involvement 




(1993) to 334 (1986).
20  We use one month’s observation from each woman in each year 
(so annual averages do not contain multiple observations from the same woman), using 
the data she reports in her last interview month in each year. 
  For all of these data sets, we look at single mothers, defined as unmarried women 
between the ages of 18 and 54, living with children age 18 or younger.  In most cases, we 
look only at single mothers with less than a high school education, the group most highly 
affected by changes in welfare.  We refer to this group as less-skilled single mothers.
21 
  Our earnings disregard information by state are taken from the Urban Institute’s 
Welfare Rules Database.  This database provides information on state-specific program 
parameters for the state TANF programs that replaced AFDC following welfare reform.  
The database includes detailed annual information not only on state earnings disregard 
policies, but on all other policies related to cash welfare programs.  We also use this data 
source to define the welfare policy variables we include in the regressions below.  (More 
detail is in the Data Appendix.) 
 
B.  A Few Graphical Comparisons 
To provide a sense of the data, we compare differential behavior among less-
skilled single mothers across three groups of states.  The high-change states are the 15 
states where the expected income gain from work increased the most between 1990 and 
2000, as discussed above.  The low-change states are the 15 states whose expected 
                                                 
20 Because the SIPP panels overlap, we often have women from multiple panels in the same year.  For 
instance, our 1988 data includes women from the last interview of the 1986 SIPP, from the ongoing 1987 
SIPP and from the early interviews of the 1988 SIPP.  
21 We weight the SIPP data by person weights throughout our analysis (important because of attribution in 
the SIPP over a panel.)  Results that we present from the CPS and ORG are not weighted, but are very 




income gain from work increased the least, while the middle-change states are the 
remaining 21 states.  We saw in Figures 3a and 3b how much these states differed in the 
income gains available to a single mother who left welfare for work following welfare 
reform. 
  Figure 4a graphs the average probability that a less-skilled single mother works in 
each of these three groups of states, using the ORG data.  The thick solid line shows the 
high-change states, the thin solid line shows the middle-change states and the dashed line 
shows the low-change states.  About one-third of our sample work in the late 1980s in all 
groups of states.  That percentage increases rapidly from the mid-1990s through 2000.  
The percentage working slows or decreases after 2000, as the economy slows down. 
  All three groups of states show quite similar trends in Figure 4a, although the 
high-change states appear to have suffered a greater decline in work in the early 1990s 
and show a somewhat more rapid rise after 1993.  This greater cyclicality of employment 
in high-change states relative to the other state groups poses a serious challenge to 
estimating the causal effects of earnings disregard policies.  Although work rises more 
rapidly in these states after 1993, part of this might be due only to the business cycle and 
would have occurred in the absence of policy changes.  We attempt to control for the 
independent effects of economic conditions in the regression analyses below, but the data 
in the Figure 4a foreshadow our results.  Although work appears to decline in the low-
change states when the economy slows down in the early 2000s, there is little evidence of 
different behavior among women in the high- and middle-change states, despite quite 




  Figure 4b graphs average hours of work in each of these three groups of states 
(based on ORG data), including the zeroes for those who don’t work.  Figure 4b looks 
almost identical to Figure 4a, with large increases in hours of work within this 
population, but little evidence of a faster increase among less-skilled single mothers in 
the high-change states.   
Figure 5 graphs average annual income for less-skilled single mothers in each of 
these three groups of states, based on the March CPS data.  Women in high-change states 
have slightly higher monthly income levels than in low- or middle-change states.  The 
pattern over time is identical, especially among the high- and middle-change states after 
1998, showing no particularly higher incomes reported in states with significantly 
increased earnings disregards.   
In short, the raw data do not indicate that low-skilled single mothers in high-
change states either worked substantially more or had higher incomes than similar 
women in states with fewer subsidies.  We have looked at similar plots using the SIPP 
data and for a wide variety of other variables without seeing noticeably different patterns.  
We summarize these results with simple difference-in-difference calculations. 
 
C.  Difference-in-Difference Comparisons 
We compare the years 1991-93 to the years 2001-03, which includes a period 
several years before welfare reform is enacted and a period several years after welfare 
reform is implemented.
22  We compare the change in a variable (take hours of work as an 
example) between these two groups of years in state group 1 versus state group 2.  Thus 
we difference across years and between two different state groups.  We make three state 
                                                 




group comparisons:  high-change to middle-change states, high-change to low-change 
states, and middle-change to low-change states.  For state groups s1 and s2, and years y1 
and y2, our difference in difference calculation is  
(1)  (Hours_s1_y2 – Hours_s1_y1) – (Hours_s2_y2 – Hours_s2_y1) 
Table 4 shows these calculations for all three state comparisons and for six 
different variables, four focused on labor force participation (probability of working, 
probability of working full-time, probability of working part-time
23, and hours of work) 
and two focused on income (annual income and annual welfare income.)   We show these 
calculations using data from all three data sets to test robustness across data sources.  We 
report Huber-White standard errors. 
The top left-hand cell on Table 4 indicates that the ORG data reveals high-change 
states showed a 3.6 point greater increase in the probability of working among low-
skilled single mothers between 2001-03 and 1991-93, than did middle-change states.  The 
March CPS data show a 4.2 point greater increase in work in high-change states, while 
the increase is 3.5 percent in the SIPP data.  Although all are positive, none are 
significant at the 5 percent level.  As discussed above, the comparison between high- and 
middle-change states is the most persuasive, since these states look most alike in their 
work incentives prior to welfare reform.  Columns 4 through 6 indicate that there is more 
evidence of significant increases in work over this period in high-change states versus 
low-change states, but these states were also more different to start with; this comparison 
may reflect those preexisting differences rather than the effect of welfare reform.  
Columns 7 through 9 indicate there are no significant differences in the change in work 
probabilities between middle- and low-change states. 
                                                 




The labor market results in Table 4 show some evidence that work increased 
faster in the high-change states versus the other states.  This increase was focused in part-
time work relative to middle-change states, and in full-time work relative to low-change 
states.  These results are not significant in all data sets, however, and are generally small.  
Compared to the much greater incentives to work more in these high-change states (see 
Figure 3b), these results seem quite weak.  
The bottom rows in Table 4 look at comparisons in total income and in public 
assistance income.  Higher earnings disregards should mean that single mothers who 
leave welfare are receiving greater payments as they go to work, hence there should be 
less loss of welfare in high incentive states and more overall income.  There is no 
evidence of more on-going public assistance receipt or greater income supplementation in 
states with high earnings disregards in these difference-in-difference calculations.
24 
  To summarize, while one might conclude that there is some evidence to suggest 
small effects of larger earnings disregards on labor supply based on the contrast between 
high-change and other states over the 1990s, this evidence is quite sensitive to the time 
period used in the analysis and to the comparison group of states.  In our opinion, these 
simple comparative results suggest that recent earnings disregard changes had little effect 
on labor supply and are consistent with the earlier literature indicating few effects of 
earnings disregards. 
 
                                                 
24 We have also done the same calculations, comparing the years 1998-2000 with the same base years 
1991-1993.   We prefer the results in Table 4, as they provide a slightly more long-term comparison and 
because the macroeconomy is more comparable in the early 2000s to the early 1990s.  The results from this 
alternative comparison are even weaker than those in Table 4, since the ORG data show no labor force 




V. Regression-adjusted Estimates of the Effects of Earnings Disregards 
The difference-in-difference calculations in the previous section suggest that 
earnings disregards changes played a negligible role in the large increases in work among 
low-income women over the 1990s.  This inference rests on the assumption that the high-
change states would have experienced similar changes in work behavior but for the 
differences in their respective earnings disregard policies.   In fact, however, the 
economic, demographic, and policy environments may have changed in different ways in 
these three state groups over time so as to offset and obscure the effect of earnings 
disregards.   For instance, unemployment appears to be more cyclical in the high-change 
states, rising more in the early 1990s and falling more over the expansion of the late 
1990s.  In this section we control for other differences in these states, using panel data to 
estimate the effects of earnings disregards on labor force behavior among single mothers 
over time within states.   
 
A. Methodology   
We first discuss our panel data estimation strategies, and then discuss the 
individual fixed effect estimates we implement with the SIPP data.  All three of our 
datasets can be used to create a state-by-year panel of data on the key variables we want 
to estimate.  We use our sample of single mothers with less than a high school degree, 
using data from either the ORG or the March CPS from 1984 through 2004, or from the 
SIPP from 1986 through 2003.
25    
We estimate regressions of the following form: 
                                                 
25 Our SIPP data is only available through 2003 (the last year of the 2001 panel).  We stop in 2004 with the 




(1)  Hist = β1 EDst + β2 Ust + β3 Pst + β4 Xist + γ1 SFEs + γ2 YFEt + εist  
where i indexes the individual, s indexes the state, and t indexes the year.  SFE represents 
a vector of state fixed effects, controlling for any state-specific differences that are 
unchanged over time.  YFE represents a vector of year fixed effects, controlling for any 
year-specific changes that affect all single mothers.  For instance, changes in the federal 
EITC are implemented everywhere in the same year and YFE would control for these 
effects.  The inclusion of state and year effects means that identification of the 
coefficients relies on variation in these variables within a state over time.   Our reported 
standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary correlations of ε, the 
error term, within states over time.   
  H is one of five dependent variables.  We focus on two measures of labor force 
involvement.  We use a 0/1 dummy variable that indexes whether or not the woman is 
working at the time of the survey,
26 and we use a continuous hours variable indicating 
how many hours the woman worked during the week of the survey, where nonworkers 
have zero hours.
27  We use three different dependent variables to measure income 
supplementation (recall we only have income data from the March CPS and the SIPP.)  
We look at total income
28, at cash welfare income from either AFDC or TANF, and at a 
0/1 dummy variable that indexes whether or not the woman is receiving cash welfare 
assistance.  All income data is deflated by the price index for Personal Consumption 
Expenditures ($2000). 
                                                 
26 For the ORG and the March CPS, this refers to work last week; for the SIPP this refers to work during 
the interview month.  
27 We estimate linear probability models for hours and for work probabilities.   
28 For the March CPS, this refers to income last year; for the SIPP it refers to the interview month 




Our key variables of interest (ED) parameterize the earnings disregard rules over 
time.  We implement two separate specifications to assess the effects of these policies on 
work behavior.  In the first specification, we simply include measures of the disregard 
rates that are applied to earnings in both the first and sixth months of an employment 
spell that follows welfare receipt.  (This is 1-t as defined in Figure 1, the marginal 
disregard on the next dollar of earnings.)  As Table 1 indicates, the earnings disregard 
rate was set by federal law at 33 percent in the first four months of work and at zero 
afterwards (that is, a 100 percent tax rate on earnings) until the mid-1990s.
29  After 
welfare reform in 1996, we use the state-specific earnings disregard rates that in many 
cases change according to the number of months a woman has been working.   
In the second specification, we use a state-specific measure of the average 
disregard rate (rather than the marginal rate) at 40 hours of work.  This is the total dollars 
a woman would receive from welfare during the first 12 months after going to work and 
working 40 hours per week at $7/hour, divided by the total dollars she would receive 
during these 12 months if she did not work and received the maximum benefit amount 
(this ratio is expressed as a percentage, so multiplied by 100).   If she receives no welfare 
income after going to work, this measure would be 0; if she has a 100 percent earnings 
disregard, so benefits are unaffected by increases in earnings, this number would be 100.  
This measure is calculated using detailed information on state benefit calculation rules 
over time.
30   
                                                 
29 Note that a few states have effective disregard rates that differ from 33 percent due to the peculiar 
method by which they calculate benefits – for example, in the late 1980s Mississippi calculated benefits as 
0.6 times the difference between the need standard and countable income.  Since the 33 percent disregard 
applies to countable income, the effective disregard is 0.6*0.33, or 19.8 percent. 
30 We also tested specifications using this same calculation at 30 hours of work per week, to see if our 
results were sensitive to the incentives at different hours of work.  The 30-hour variable never showed a 




To control for the effects of different economic conditions, policies, and 
demographic changes we include as control variables U, the unemployment rate in each 
state and year; P, a vector of state welfare policy parameters in each state and year; and 
X, a vector of individual and family characteristics for each sample observation.  X 
includes race, ethnicity, marital status, the number of children under age 19 in the 
household, the number of adults in the household, and the age of the mother, defined as 
four dummy variables for ages 18-22, 23-30, 31-40 and 41-54 (allowing for non-linear 
differences between these age groups.)  
  Our vector of state welfare program parameters, P, controls for policies other than 
earnings disregards that may affect work behavior.  All of our regressions include a 
control for (inflation-adjusted) maximum benefit levels.  As Figure 1 indicated, the 
maximum benefit (G) and the various disregard parameters are key determinants of work 
behavior.  We use two alternative specifications to control for other program parameters.  
First, we control for when major welfare reforms are implemented.  This includes a 
dummy variable that turns “on” when a major state-wide waiver is implemented in the 
mid-1990s, and a dummy variable that turns “on” when the state’s TANF plan is 
implemented after 1996.
31   These variables have been widely used in the literature.   
Different states elect different “bundles” of policy change and these dummy variables 
control for the overall effect of changes without distinguishing between them.   
Our second approach is to parameterize the specific policies within states, 
including controls for time limits, for exemptions from work requirements, for family 
                                                 
31 If the waiver or the TANF plan is only in effect for part of the year, the dummy variable is replaced with 
the fraction of the year in which the plan was in effect.  The waiver variable turns “off” when a TANF plan 
is implemented. We have duplicated our analysis using a single variable that turns on when either a waiver 




caps, and for state sanction policy.  These are dummy variables, equal to one in states 
where more stringent policies are implemented.  This second specification provides 
potentially better controls for specific policy design differences across states, but it has its 
limitations as well.  It is hard to parameterize these policies except in very aggregate 
ways (i.e., characterizing sanctions as ‘stringent’, ‘moderate’ or ‘lenient’), and there may 
be interactions across these policies that are important.  In this case, the former approach 
of simply controlling for a separate state TANF effect in each state could be more 
effective than trying to control for the effects of separate policy elements.  
The Data Appendix lists all of the variables used in the various specifications and 
gives detailed definitions and sources.  Appendix Table 1 shows the means of these 
variables for each data source, across all years and separately in the years before and after 
welfare reform is implemented.  
Unlike the ORG and the March CPS, the SIPP data provides longitudinal data on 
individual single mothers over time.  The estimation approach outlined above is the only 
one that we can utilize with the cross-sectional ORG or March CPS data, but it does not 
take account of multiple observations on the same person that exist within the SIPP data.  
Hence, using SIPP data, we can estimate a regression that takes account of individual 
omitted variables by controlling for an individual fixed effect.  This should provide a 
better identified estimate of the earnings disregard effect.  This is the regression 
(2)  Hist = β1 EDst + β2 Ust + β3 Pst + β4 Xist + γ1 YFEt + γ2 IFEi +  μist  
where IFEi is a vector of individual fixed effects, estimated for each person i who has 
more than one observation in the data.
32   
                                                 
32 There are no state fixed effects in equation (2), since these would be identified only if individuals moved 




As noted above, we extract one observation per year for each single mother in the 
SIPP panels, using the last interview month in which she has data for that year.  For 
women who are single mothers throughout the SIPP panel, this will give us from 2 to 4 
observations per person, depending on the length of each SIPP panel (this estimation 
drops all the women who are observed as single mothers only once.)   The regression 
identifies the effects of earnings disregards from changes in the behavior of women over 
time within states where earnings disregard parameters change.
33 
  When we discuss the SIPP estimates below, we present estimates based on both 
equations (1) and (2) using the SIPP data, referring to the latter as SIPP Fixed Effect 
regressions.  Because these regressions allow us to control for differences between states 
and among individuals, we believe that these regressions should provide our best estimate 
of the impact of the earnings disregards on individual behavior.  
 
B.  Effects of earnings disregards on labor force participation 
To give a flavor of the full regression results, Table 5 shows the results from our 
estimates of the probability of work, using our first specification of disregard rates which 
controls for the state disregard rate at one and six months.  The first four columns show 
how the results compare across our three data sets in a regression that includes only the 
disregard rates, the maximum state welfare benefit, state fixed effects, and year fixed 
effects.  Columns (1) through (3) utilize equation 1 to estimate a panel data regression 
with each of our three data sets, while column (4) utilizes equation 2 to estimate an 
individual fixed effects regression with the SIPP data.  Columns (5) through (8) also 
                                                                                                                                                 
 




include the dummy variables for TANF and state waiver program implementation, as 
well as the unemployment and demographic control variables.  The last four columns 
replace the TANF and state waiver program dummy variables with controls for specific 
state welfare policies.   
The disregard rate in month 1 is insignificant in all specifications and all data sets.  
The disregard rate in month six, however, appears to have a positive and moderately 
significant effect on hours worked in the ORG and CPS data, but the effect in the SIPP 
data is much smaller and insignificant.  Interpreted causally, the ORG results in column 9 
(specification 3) imply that a change from no disregard (as existed under AFDC) to a 50 
percent disregard (the modal value in 2000) would lead to a 3.1 percentage point 
(50*0.063) increase in the fraction of single mothers without a high school degree who 
work.  This represents about one-fifth of the total increase in work among this population 
between 1995 and 2000, and is relatively large.  The SIPP data, however, show smaller 
and insignificant coefficients on the earnings disregard parameters.  We find the SIPP 
fixed effect results most convincing, which would suggest a zero effect.  We conclude 
that while some data sets and specifications suggest a positive effect of greater earnings 
disregards on labor supply, the best evidence indicates that these effects are not 
significant.   
The coefficients on the remainder of the variables are not surprising.  Because of 
the inclusion of state fixed effects, only variables that change significantly over time 
within states have robustly estimated effects.  The effects of recent policy changes are 





34  Both the implementation of TANF and of waivers have small and 
insignificant effects.  This is perhaps surprising since previous research has found 
significant effects of waivers and TANF on labor market involvement.  Two previous 
studies that investigate the effects of welfare reform on labor market involvement using a 
similar methodological approach are Moffitt (1999) and Schoeni and Blank (2000).  Both 
of these papers find significant effects of TANF and waiver implementation on both labor 
force participation and hours of work among high school dropouts, but results are based 
on different data, aggregated into educational categories and the years included in the 
regressions are different.
35  When these two variables are replaced with four variables 
controlling for specific policy choices, there is little evidence that these other policies 
have large effects either, although fewer work exemptions generally seem to increase 
labor supply and family caps appear to reduce it (an unexpected effect).
36 
The coefficients on the other included variables appear consistent with the 
findings of previous work.  A 1-point rise in the unemployment rate is associated with 
more than a 1 percentage point decline in labor force participation, and this effect is even 
bigger in the fixed effect specification.
37   Younger single mothers with more total 
children, with more preschoolers, and who are never-married are less involved with the 
labor market.  Both black and Hispanic women are also less likely to be in the labor 
market.  
                                                 
34 This is a common result in panel data estimates with state and year fixed effects, since benefit levels 
largely trend downward with inflation and do not change markedly within states over time.  
35 Both of these earlier studies use March CPS data, aggregated into cells by demographic characteristics.  
Moffitt (1999) looks only at waiver effects, while Schoeni and Blank (2000) also look at TANF effects. 
36 Selecting the best way to specify these specific policies is difficult, and different researchers have 
utilized a variety of approaches.  Our regressions include a relatively simple specification, which should 
nonetheless control for the major differences in these policies across states.  The important result is that the 
inclusion of these variables does not affect the estimated disregard coefficients. 
37 This high estimate is consistent with other research showing women’s greater labor market 




We show Table 5 to provide a sense of the entire set of regression results.  From 
this point on, we look at the coefficients on the disregard variables only, across our two 
specifications and for each of the three data sets.
38  We show a variety of estimates 
because we want to assure the readers that our conclusions are robust to alternative data 
analysis.
39  Table 6 shows these coefficients for two labor market variables.  Part 1 of 
Table 6 shows the coefficients for the probability of working, while Part 2 show the 
coefficients for estimates of hours worked.  As in Table 5, Specification 1 includes only 
the disregard rates for months 1 and 6, the state maximum benefit level, along with state 
and year fixed effects.  Specification 2 also includes the dummy variables for the 
implementation of TANF and Waiver programs, as well as the demographic variables.  
Specification 3 replaces the two implementation variables with the four specific policy 
parameters for time limits, work exemptions, family caps and sanctions. 
Each coefficient reported in Table 6 comes from a different regression. The first 
four columns show the coefficients on the six month earnings disregard rate from 
regressions run on each data set and each specification.  (These rows duplicate the results 
shown in Table 5.  Although these regressions also include the 1 month disregard rate, we 
do not report those coefficients which are insignificant in all specifications for all 
variables.
40)  The second four columns show the coefficient on the average earnings 
                                                 
38 Full regression results for all of the regressions reported in Tables 6-8 are available from the authors 
upon request. 
39 In addition to the results shown here for single mothers with less than a high school degree, we also 
looked at results for single mothers with a high school degree or less.  The conclusions were not different. 
40 We are not surprised by this result.  During the AFDC period of our data (1983 through 1996) first year 
earnings disregard rates are relatively high (at 33 percent), yet they end within four months, creating little 
long-term incentive to enter work.  A number of states retain this type of structure under TANF.  Several 
states provide very generous disregards in the first few months, but then eliminate them entirely within a 
few months.  Such short-term subsidies may not provide much additional incentive to encourage women to 
enter the labor market.  In contrast, states with earnings disregards that last six months tend to have 




disregard at 40 hours of work (calculated over the first 12 months of work), an alternative 
way of specifying the effect of the earnings disregard.   It is not clear which of these two 
specifications of earnings disregards are superior.  On the one hand, it is appealing to use 
the program parameters rather than a composite index, since these involve less discretion 
in construction.  On the other hand, the precise parameter shows the incentives at only 
one point in time, while women who leave welfare and go to work face a changing set of 
incentives over time in most states.  Our average disregard variable provides a better 
sense of the average incentives women face in each state as they leave welfare. 
We have already discussed the results on the probability of working when the 
earnings disregards are specified as the disregard rate at six months.  The results in 
columns 5-8 of part 1 using the alternative specification of earnings disregards do not 
change our conclusions from the discussion of Table 5.   In fact, the coefficient on the 
average earnings disregard is never significant.   We conclude that earnings disregards 
have few effects on the probability of working. 
Part 2 provides a similar set of estimates for hours of work.  The results are 
markedly similar to those in Part 1.  There is some evidence in the CPS and ORG data of 
relatively small and marginally significant effects (although the significant coefficient for 
the March CPS in specification 1 for the average earnings disregard is of the wrong sign!)  
The SIPP results show no effect of earnings disregards on hours of work. 
Our overall conclusion regarding the labor force effects of large earnings 
disregard changes in state welfare policies is that these policies had remarkably little 
effect.  This is perhaps surprising given how large these changes were.  We discuss 
                                                                                                                                                 
longer-term subsidy to work within a state, which may be the relevant factor determining whether earnings 




reasons for this result in the next section, after investigating the income effects of 
earnings disregards. 
 
C.  Effects of earnings disregards on income 
As noted before, we expected expanded earnings disregards to increase income, 
since the dominant movement in the post-reform era was to reduce welfare and increase 
work.  States with large increases in earnings disregards should provide greater subsidies 
to low-wage women and improve their economic situation.  In this section, we investigate 
these effects across our various specifications, data sets, and estimation approaches. 
Table 7 is set up in a way similar to Table 6, showing the coefficients on the 
earnings disregard variables from a variety of specifications.  Part 1 looks at the 
estimated effects of earnings disregards on total income; Part 2 uses public assistance 
income as the dependent variable; and Part 3 looks at the probability of public assistance 
receipt.  We look at results across the same three specifications that were also presented 
in Tables 5 and 6.  As before, the first three columns show the coefficients on the six 
month disregard rate, while the last three columns replace this with the average earnings 
disregard at 40 hours.  Row 1 uses a panel data estimation technique with March CPS 
data; row 2 shows similar estimates from the SIPP; and row 3 estimates individual fixed 
effect regressions in the SIPP.    
The results in Part 1 indicate that there are no noticeable effects of earnings 
disregards on total reported income, regardless of how earnings disregards are specified, 
the other variables in the regression, or the data and estimation technique.  Indeed, in a 




effect estimators in the SIPP.  For instance, the SIPP fixed effect estimates using 
specification 3 suggests that a change of 50 points in the disregard at month 6 would 
reduce income by $936 per year. 
Because we are surprised at the lack of income effects, in Parts 2 and 3, we 
investigate the effect of earnings disregards on public assistance usage.  Realize that the 
ability to work a substantial number of hours and still receive public assistance should 
provide incentives for women to remain on public assistance longer, even while going to 
work.  Hence, one should expect to see a relative increase (i.e., less of a decline) in the 
probability of public assistance receipt in higher earnings disregard states.  This is 
particularly true if there are no labor supply effects.  If women’s work behavior changes 
similarly in high and low disregard states, then the primary effect of earnings disregards 
should be to increase the receipt of public assistance income at higher levels of work in 
high disregard states.  Part 2 asks whether there is evidence that women are more likely 
to stay on public assistance in high disregard states.   The answer is clearly ‘no’.  The 
coefficients in all specifications, data, and estimation approaches are small and 
insignificant.   
Finally, in part 3, we also look at public assistance income.  The effect of earnings 
disregards on cash assistance is uncertain.  On the one hand, among women who go to 
work, public assistance should be higher among women who can continue to receive 
benefits in high-disregard states.  On the other hand, if earnings disregards induce greater 
labor supply, then women getting a reduced benefit might receive less than women in a 
low-disregard state who do not go to work at all.  Of course, if there are no labor supply 




evidence for positive effects of earnings disregards on public assistance income received 
by less-skilled single mothers. 
As the difference-in-difference estimates suggested in the previous section, we 
conclude that there is no evidence that earnings disregards are helping to subsidize the 
incomes of women in high disregard states.  In fact, this entire section suggests that 
earnings disregards had few effects at all, on labor supply or on income, among single 
mothers.  The next section discusses why this might be true. 
 
VI.  Understanding these results 
Our estimation results are both surprising and somewhat troubling from a policy 
perspective.  Many states implemented large earnings disregards in their TANF programs 
in order to stimulate greater labor market involvement, and we show little evidence that 
this occurred.  While previous research indicated few effects from earnings disregards on 
labor supply, the changes implemented by high incentive states were far greater than 
those studied in much of the previous research literature, and one might have expected 
these larger policy changes would show greater effects.  Furthermore, as discussed above, 
earlier literature suggested that increases in work among nonworkers were offset by 
declines in work among already-working women (arrows 3 and 4 in Figure 1).  This 
offsetting effect is very unlikely to have occurred following welfare reform, when states 
were pushing to move more and more women into work and off welfare.  Almost every 
state halved the number of families receiving welfare in the five years after TANF 
reforms were implemented, suggesting that very few women entered cash assistance in 




that implemented high disregards does not appear to have increased relative to states that 
did not. 
Even if there were no labor supply effects, one might expect that these earnings 
disregards would supplement incomes for low-wage workers leaving welfare.  Indeed, 
the MFIP results discussed above suggested exactly this outcome, namely, that earnings 
disregards had anti-poverty effects but no labor supply effects.  Based on this evidence, 
analysts have supported earnings disregards as a way to help provide additional income 
as women leave welfare.
41  Hence, the lack of evidence in this paper on income 
supplementation is also surprising.    
In this section we suggest a clear reason for the lack of effects:  very few women 
who go to work at 30 hours or more are taking advantage of earnings disregards over an 
extended period of time, even in high incentive states.  We document this fact below and 
then discuss reasons for it. 
In the analyses above, we show that there are no employment effects of higher 
earnings disregards; high incentive states and low incentive states had essentially the 
same increases in work after accounting for differences in economic conditions.  Women 
working in states that increased their disregards, i.e. high-incentive states, remain eligible 
for cash assistance even if their earnings increase substantially.  For women in low-
incentive states, however, increased earnings take them past the “break-even point” more 
quickly and they lose welfare eligibility.  Thus, to the extent that earnings disregards are 
utilized, the number of women who report both earnings and welfare income should rise 
in high-incentive states relative to low-incentive states.   
                                                 




We can test this prediction in the SIPP data, which has monthly reports on all 
income sources.
42  Table 8 explores the probability that single women combine work and 
welfare, comparing states with higher and lower earnings disregards.  We also 
differentiate between women working full time (35 hours or more) and part-time.  While 
many states allowed women to remain eligible for cash assistance with moderate earnings 
levels, only high incentive states allowed women working full time to continue to receive 
welfare payments.  Differences across state groups should therefore be more pronounced 
for the fraction of women working full-time while on welfare. 
Table 8 shows regression results similar to those shown in Tables 6 and 7, where 
we test the effects of earnings disregards on the probability of working and receiving 
welfare, using different control variables, different specifications of earnings disregards, 
and two different estimation techniques (with and without controlling for individual fixed 
effects within our SIPP data.)   We show the coefficients on the earnings disregard 
variable for regressions that estimate the probability of both working and receiving 
welfare, for working full-time and receiving welfare, and for working part-time and 
receiving welfare.  
The coefficients suggest that there are no effects of earnings disregards on the 
probability of combining work and welfare receipt.  All estimated coefficients are small 
and insignificant.  This is true for the overall probability of both working and receiving 
welfare, as well as for the probability of working full time or part time and receiving 
welfare.  In short, once we control for state and year effects, as well as other economic, 
demographic and policy variables, single mothers in higher disregard states show no 
                                                 
42 The March CPS allows us to see if women have earnings and welfare income over the past year, but we 




increased probability of receiving welfare while employed.  The implication is that 
women are not taking advantage of the higher disregards in the high-incentive states, and 
are no more likely to collect welfare while working than in lower disregard states.  
To double-check this result with one other data set, we requested administrative 
data from the Department of Health and Human Services on state reports of working 
families on TANF.  We have this data for several years in the early 2000s. If we compare 
the share of working families on TANF within our three different state groupings, we 
find no difference between states with higher versus lower disregards.  In 2001, high 
disregard states report 25 percent of the families who received TANF were also working; 
versus 26 percent in our middle incentive states.  Low incentive states report a slightly 
lower percent (21 percent) of welfare recipients who work.
43  These administrative data 
are consistent with the conclusion that women in states with substantial earnings 
disregards are no more likely to receive welfare while working than women in states with 
more modest disregards.  
These results indicate that women do not utilize the earnings disregards that 
would allow them to continue to receive public assistance checks even when working a 
substantial number of hours in high-change states.  There are at least three reasons why 
this might occur.  First, there are costs to participating in welfare and these costs may be 
greater once working.  Mothers of children who are working a substantial number of 
hours may find it harder to find the time to check in with the welfare office on a regular 
basis.  Such costs may include not only time and inconvenience, but stigma effects, as 
                                                 
43 We do not want to make too much of these data, since the base of who is counted in TANF differs 
somewhat across states and is not entirely comparable.  Some states created separate state programs for 




well as the psychological cost of dealing with welfare office demands and bureaucrats.
44  
Once women enter work and have greater earnings, they may decide that they are better 
offer leaving welfare entirely.  In fact, women on welfare typically indicate that they 
believe work requirements are a good idea (Cherlin, et. al., 2000).  
Second, women may leave welfare once they are working substantial hours, in 
order to preserve their remaining welfare eligibility.  In a world of time limits, receiving 
welfare today will reduce future welfare availability.  Grogger (2004) has shown that 
time limits cause women to leave welfare faster when they have an incentive (such as 
small children) to preserve future eligibility. 
Third, many welfare offices made major changes in the ways they dealt with 
clients following welfare reform.  Caseworkers were trained to send a ‘tough’ message 
about the need for women to find a job and leave welfare (Gais, Nathan, Lurie, and 
Kaplan, 2001).   It is quite possible that caseworkers did not encourage women to stay on 
welfare once they started to work, even if the program design allowed it.  In some 
situations, caseworkers themselves may have lacked information about the extensive 
availability of ongoing benefits to workers. Or, even if they knew this information, they 
may not have communicated it to clients, preferring to push them off welfare if possible.  
Hence some women who entered work may simply have assumed they had no more 
access to public assistance support. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
We have found little evidence in this paper that the large earnings disregards 
enacted by some states post-welfare reform have had significant effects on labor supply 
                                                 




or that they provided income supplementation to low-skilled single mothers.  Estimates 
from a variety of data sets, specifications and estimation approaches all support this 
conclusion. 
The lack of labor supply effects is consistent with much of the earlier literature on 
earnings disregards; this is surprising, however, since the changes in earnings disregards 
the mid-1990s in a subset of states were far greater than those measured in earlier 
research.  Furthermore, given the large reductions in welfare rolls, the lack of labor 
supply effects is not because greater work among nonworkers was offset by less work 
and more welfare among those just past the previous welfare eligibility level.  It appears 
that women simply did not take-up the higher earnings disregards in states that offered 
them.   We cannot tell, however, if this was a conscious choice on the part of these 
women, or if it was the result of misinformation.  We expect that this is due to a 
combination of factors, including reluctance on the part of women to remain in the public 
assistance system, lack of information about availability of ongoing benefits, and efforts 
by case managers to move women off welfare sooner rather than later.  The complexity 
of state earnings disregard rules may make them less effective as incentives, particularly 
for states that have enacted changes in disregard rates that occur as an employment spell 
lengthens beyond the first few months. 
If women are not utilizing these earnings disregards, there is no income 
supplementation provided by this policy.  This is in contrast to some of the waiver 
experiments, such as MFIP, which shows earnings disregards having a significant anti-
poverty effect.  The environment in which these waivers were implemented was different, 




take advantage of the income supplementation that the earnings disregards provided.  It is 
much less likely that caseworkers following welfare reform encouraged women to remain 
on welfare, even in states with high disregards.     
Our conclusion from this research is that state earnings disregards enacted as part 
of welfare reform, while very large in some cases, have had remarkably little effect on 
the behavior or the well-being of single mother families.  Women who were successful in 
finding work left welfare participation entirely.  Hence, states that enacted very generous 
disregards show similar changes in labor supply and income to states that enacted more 
modest changes.  Of course, this also means that states with high earnings disregards are 
paying few benefits to workers, so while they are getting few benefits from these high 
disregard policies, neither are they paying any costs. 
From the point of view of researchers, these results confirm the take-up literature 
that indicates the gap between on-the-books policies and their actual receipt.
45  Anyone 
simulating welfare receipt in high-disregard states might assume a substantial number of 
working low-wage single mother families would receive some ongoing welfare benefits, 
but this would be inaccurate.  In fact, many working women who are eligible for ongoing 
benefits do not receive them. 
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Federal Earnings Disregard Rules in the AFDC Program  
1979-1996 
              






Cap on State 
Child Care 
Disregards  










1979-80 all  $30  none  none  0.66  no  cap  
              
              
1981-84  1 to 4  $30  $160  $75  0.66  150% of the    
 5  on  $0  $160  $75  1.00  need standard   
              
1985-89  1 to 4  $30  $160  $75  0.66  185% of the    
  5 to 12  $30  $160  $75  1.00  need standard   
 13  on  $0  $160  $75  1.00     
              
1990-96  1 to 4  $30  $175  $90  0.66  185% of the    
  5 to 12  $30  $175  $90  1.00  need standard   
 13  on  $0  $175  $90  1.00     
              












Distribution of State Earnings Disregard Rates 
1990-2000 
             
Part 1:  In First Month of Employment 
% Disregard in Month 
1 of Employment 
1990 1995  2000 
0  0    0  3  LA,TN,WY  
16-20 1  MS  2  MS,  MI  3  MI, NE, SD   
21-25 0    1  VT  2  MT, VT   
26-30  0    0  1  AZ  
31-35  50  45    7  AK,CO,DE,GA,IN,MD, VA 
36-40  0    0  3  ID, KS, MN   
41-50 0    0    17
CA,DC,FL,HI,ME,MA,NH,NM,NY,OH,OK,OR,PA,RI,SC,UT,WA
51-60 0    1  IA  2  IA, WV   
61-70 0    1  IL  3  IL, MO, ND   
71-90  0    0  1  TX  
100 0    1  CT  9  AL,AR,CT,KY,MS,NV,NJ,NC,WI 
             
Part 2:  In Sixth Month of Employment 
% Disregard in Month 
6 of Employment 
1990 1995  2000 
0  51  45    10 CO,DE,GA,IN,LA,SC,TN,TX,VA,WY 
16-20 0    1  MI  4  AL,MI,NE,SD 
21-25 0    1  VT  2  MT,VT  
26-30  0    0  2  AZ,NC  
31-35  0    1 CA 3  AK,KY,MD  
36-40  0    0  3  MN,ID,KS  
41-50 0    0    18 CA,DC,FL,HI,ME,MA,NV,NH,   
NJ,NM,NY,OH,OK,OR,PA,RI,UT,WA 
51-60 0    1  IA  2  IA,WV  
61-70 0    1  IL  3  ND,IL,MO  
71-90  0    0  0    














Cash Welfare Payments Available to a Welfare Recipient with a Preschooler Who Begins to 
Work at $7.00/hour, 30 hours/week (numbers in 2000$) 
             
 1990 
 
   2000 
    
State  1st Month   6th Month   13th Month    1st Month  6th Month  13th Month    
 











Alabama  0  0 0    164  0 0    288 
Alaska  784 543  506    672 672  621    2120 
Arizona  97  0 0    0  0 0    -184 
Arkansas  0 0  0    0 0  0    588 
California  595 354  317    301 301  301    1232 
                 
Colorado 217  12  0    0  0  0    68 
Connecticut  455 214  176    543 543  543    5132 
Delaware 0  0  0    269  144  129    2588 
D.C. 241  0  0    167  167  167    3140 
Florida 98  0  0    141  141  141    2044 
                 
Georgia  72  0 0    0  0 0    420 
Hawaii  518 277  240    487 487  487    4136 
Idaho  124  0 0    0  0 0    680 
Illinois 189  0  0    85  85  85    1212 
Indiana  0 0  0    0 0  0    840 
                 
Iowa 262  21  0    251  251  251    3032 
Kansas 209  0  0    133  133  133    1324 
Kentucky  212 80  60    262 95  0    -332 
Louisiana 0  0  0    240  240  0    1392 
Maine  543 302  265    388 388  388    1292 
                 
Maryland 237  0  0    23  23  23    372 
Massachusetts  452 211  174    416 416  416    2708 
Michigan  311  70 32    94  94 94    752 
Minnesota  394 153  116    244 244  244    1676 
Mississippi 114  0 0    170  170  0    312 
                 
Missouri 96  0  0    268  268  0    3684 
Montana 193  0  0    171  171  171    1076 
Nebraska 0  0  0    10  10  10    1176 
Nevada 143  0  0    348  86  0    1990 
New  Hampshire  374 133  96    338 338  338    1988 
                 




New  Mexico  0 0  0    0 0  0    -648 
New  York  450 209  171    153 153  153    44 
North  Carolina  71  0 0    272  0 0    1324 
North  Dakota 231 0  0    0 342 342    2850 
                 
Ohio 148  0  0    181  181  181    2084 
Oklahoma 137  0  0    90  90  90    1876 
Oregon 284  43  6    0  0  0    -892 
Pennsylvania  234  0 0    0  0 0    240 
Rhode  Island  407 166  129    377 377  377    3020 
                 
South  Carolina  125 6  0    141 0  0    652 
South  Dakota  211  0 0    0  0 0    -268 
Tennessee 242  4 0    185  185  185    1904 
Texas  0  0 0    201  0 0    1140 
Utah 281  99  71    239  239  239    1312 
                 
Vermont  555 314  277    253 253  253    704 
Virginia  0 0  0    0 0  0    492 
Washington  355 114  77    284 284  284    1988 
West Virginia  42  0  0    178  178  178    1440 
Wisconsin  376 135  98    628 628  628    5132 
                 
Wyoming  180  0 0    0  0 0    564 
                 
Column Mean  226  68  55    192  167  149    1450 
               
Source: Authors' Calculations.  We assume this woman has two children, one a preschooler, so she is eligible for the 
state child care disregard in the AFDC program in 1990 and receives the state work expense disregard (if working.) 
1This is the average, across the first 12 months of work, of the expected income gain between 1990 and 2000 at 30 
hours of work, assuming a constant wage ($7/hour) and applying the state earnings disregard rules. The expected 
income gain is the difference between expected income if working 30 hours/week versus expected income if not 






















Difference-in-Difference Comparisons Across State Groups, (defined by post-welfare reform 
earnings disregard [ED] levels) and Pre- and Post-welfare reform (2001-2003 versus 1991-1993) 
                    
 
High ED states vs. Middle 
ED states   
High ED states vs. Low ED 
states   
Middle ED states vs Low ED 
states 
  Data source:    Data source:    Data source: 
   ORG   
 March 
CPS    SIPP      ORG   
 March 
CPS    SIPP      ORG   
 March 
CPS    SIPP  
Percent  working  0.036 0.042 0.035    0.062** 0.019 0.065*   0.026  -0.022  0.03 
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)   (0.021) (0.028) (0.028)   (0.017) (0.023) (0.020) 
                 
Percent full-time  0.007  0.034  -0.006    0.044* -0.002 0.031    0.037* -0.036 0.037* 
  (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)   (0.018) (0.025) (0.026)   (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) 
                 
Percent part-time  0.028*  0.008   0.041     0.018   0.021   0.034     -0.010  0.013   (0.007) 
  (0.014) (0.018) (0.021)   (0.015) (0.019) (0.023)   (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) 
                 
Hours of work  1.300  1.810  0.087    2.451** 0.629 2.359*   1.151  -1.181  1.486 
  (0.720) (0.983) (1.009)   (0.778) (1.071) (1.084)   (0.646) (0.912) (0.778) 
                    
Total income  na  -44  682    na  1232  1351*    na  1276  670 
    (646) (510)      (634) (553)      (701) (397) 
                 
Welfare income  na  -171  36    na  156  -579**    na  327.3**  -615 ** 
      (127)  (122)       (132)  (122)        (99)  (87) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  See text for definition of state groups and detail on data sources. 
















Determinants of the Probability of Working Among Less-Skilled Single Mothers 
                   
 Specification  1    Specification 2    Specification 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8)    (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
   ORG   
March  
CPS   SIPP 
SIPP 
w/ IFE      ORG   
March  
CPS   SIPP 
SIPP 
w/ IFE      ORG   
March  
CPS   SIPP 
SIPP 
w/ IFE  
Disregard  rate  -0.058 -0.055 -0.096 -0.091  -0.053 -0.042 -0.055 -0.048   -0.044 -0.024 -0.096 -0.117 
  at month 1  (0.033)  (0.054)  (0.073) (0.071)   (0.029)  (0.045) (0.064) (0.069)  (0.025) (0.042) (0.068) (0.082)
                     
Disregard rate  0.074*  0.083*  0.044  0.034    0.070* .076* 0.000 -0.028    0.063* 0.057 0.021 0.030 
  at month 6  (0.029)  (0.037)  (0.048) (0.050)   (0.026)  (0.030) (0.052) (0.058)  (0.024) (0.038) (0.047) (0.059)
                     
Benefit  max-  -0.013 -0.004 0.028* -0.015  -0.021 -0.012 0.003 -0.013   -0.022 -0.013 0.009 -0.015 
  imum  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.014) (0.016)   (0.013)  (0.013) (0.018) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
                     
Waiver program  ─  ─  ─  ─   -0.000  0.000  0.016  0.058    ─  ─  ─  ─ 
  (1=yes)         (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.037)        
                     
TANF program  ─  ─  ─  ─   0.007  -0.069  0.101  0.053    ─  ─  ─  ─ 
  (1=yes)            (0.043)  (0.059)  (0.108)  (0.125)          
                     
Time limits  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─   -0.006  -0.008  -0.028  -0.089 
  (1=strict)                      (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.048)
                     
Work exemp-  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─   0.026*  0.049  -0.014  -0.060 
 tion (1=strict)                      (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.042)  (0.037)
                     
Family cap  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─   -0.024*  -0.000  -0.051*  0.002 
  (1= yes)                      (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.031)
                     
Sanctions  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─  ─   -0.006  -0.001  -0.038  0.004 
  (1=strict)                      (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.044)  (0.054)
                     
Unemployment  ─  ─  ─  ─  
-




0.013** -0.009* -0.013* 
-
0.026* 
  rate            (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005) (0.012)   (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)












0.060** -0.038  ─ 
  (1=yes)            (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.026)    (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.026)  
                     
Hispanic  ─  ─  ─  ─   -0.030  -0.026 
-
0.060**  ─   -0.030  -0.026 
-
0.065** ─ 
  (1=yes)            (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.018)    (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.019)  
                     













  children            (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.010)   (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010)
                     
Number of   ─  ─  ─  ─   0.019** 0.010  0.038** -0.007  
-
0.019** 0.010 0.038** -0.007 
  adults            (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.011)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
                     













  (1=yes)            (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.015) (0.117)   (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.120)
                     








0.153** 0.006 -0.007 
(18≤Age1≤22)         (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.076)  (0.010) (0.014) (0.025)  (0.076)
                     
Mother's age2  ─  ─  ─  ─  
-




0.045** -0.053* 0.023 
(23≤Age2≤30)         (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.021)  (0.040)
                     
Mother's age3  ─  ─  ─  ─   0.033** 0.043** 0.049*  0.032   .0.033** 0.043** 0.050*  0.032 
(31≤Age3≤40)         (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.007) (0.013) (0.024)  (0.026)
  (Ages 41-54 are the omitted category)                       
All regressions include state and year fixed effects.  Columns (4), (8), and (12) include individual fixed effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are corrected for state clustering. 







The Effect of Earnings Disregards on Labor Force Variables Among Less-Skilled Single 
Mothers 
                     
Part 1:  Dependent variable = Probability of working 
     Disregard rate definition 
Data source    Disregard at month 6    Avg earnings disregard @ 40 hours 
  
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3   
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3 
  ORG   0.074*  0.070*  0.063*   0.004    0.010    0.011 
   (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
              
  March  CPS    0.083*  0.076*  0.057  -0.075  -0.061  -0.051 
   (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.040) 
              
  SIPP   0.044  -0.000  0.022  -0.063  -0.073  -0.074 
   (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.046)  (0.081)  (0.077)  (0.071) 
              
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l  0.034    -0.028   0.027  0.027  0.007  0.041 
  Fixed Effects    (0.050)    (0.058)    (0.049)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.063) 
                       
Part 2:  Dependent variable = Hours of work (including zeroes) 
     Disregard rate definition 
Data source    Disregard at month 6    Avg earnings disregard @ 40 hours 
  
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3   
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3 
  ORG    0.028*    0.027**    0.023*   0.004  0.006  0.007 
   (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
              
  March  CPS   0.027  0.026*  0.018  -0.031*  -0.023  -0.021 
   (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
              
  SIPP   0.016  -0.001  0.005  -0.013  -0.015  -0.016 
   (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.030) 
              
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l  -0.001    -0.012   0.003  0.017  0.017  0.018 
   Fixed Effects  (0.020)     (0.021)    (0.023)   (0.021)   (0.024)    (0.023) 
Each cell represents the coefficient from a separate regression.  Specifications 1, 2, and 3 are 
detailed in Table 5. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 












The Effect of Earnings Disregards on Income Variables Among Less-Skilled Single Mothers 
                     
Part 1:  Dependent variable = Total Income 
     Disregard rate definition 
Data source    Disregard at month 6    Avg earnings disregard @ 40 hours 
  
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3   
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3 
                     
 March CPS    0.10    0.99    -4.12    -3.14    1.54    2.86 
    (7.20)   (8.66)  (7.59)  (8.66)  (7.50)   (7.09) 
                 
  SIPP    4.75  -0.75  1.42  -0.26  -2.77   -3.21 
    (9.75)   (8.11)  (8.07)  (15.65)   (13.54)    (12.63) 
                 
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l  -18.31    -27.19  -20.50   12.83   13.51  14.98 
   Fixed Effects   (9.53)    (11.84)    (10.31)    (9.55)    (10.49)    (10.47) 
Part 2:  Dependent variable = Public Assistance Income 
     Disregard rate definition 
Data source    Disregard at month 6    Avg earnings disregard @ 40 hours 
  
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3   
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3 
                     
  March  CPS    -1.72   -2.48  -1.04   5.70   4.49  4.73 
    (2.09)   (2.06)  (2.02)  (3.38)  (3.23)   (3.00) 
                 
 SIPP     -7.15*    -4.73*    -4,36*    5.03    2.92    3.06 
    (2.92)   (2.33)  (2.35)  (4.99)  (4.14)   (3.55) 
                 
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l   1.09    -0.66  0.68  6.31  4.74   5.50 
  Fixed  Effects   (2.52)     (2.37)   (3.40)   (3.27)  (4.04)    (3.57) 
Part 3:  Dependent variable = Probability of Public Assistance Receipt 
     Disregard rate definition 
Data source    Disregard at month 6    Avg earnings disregard @ 40 hours 
  
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3   
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3 
                     
 March CPS    -0.053    -0.049    -0.042    0.109    0.094    0.084 
    (0.041)   (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.057)  (0.056)   (0.051) 
                 
  SIPP    -0.037   0.052  0.003  0.067  0.089   0.063 
    (0.049)   (0.046)  (0.053)  (0.071)  (0.061)   (0.060) 
                 
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l   0.023    0.036  0.015  0.001  -0.003   0.007 
   Fixed Effects  (0.060)     (0.053)   (0.070)   (0.080)  (0.092)    (0.079) 
Each cell represents the coefficient from a separate regression.  Specifications 1, 2, and 3 are detailed in 
Table 5. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 





The Effect of Earnings Disregards on the Probability of Combining Work and Welfare 
Based on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
                     
    Disregard Rate Definition 




ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3   
Specific 
ation 1   
Specific 
ation 2   
Specific 
ation 3 
1.  Probability of working and receiving welfare        
  SIPP   0.020  0.027  0.026  -0.001  -0.001  -0.010 
   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.023) 
              
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l   0.019    -0.012   0.009  0.042  0.030  0.046 
  Fixed Effects    (0.034)    (0.035)    (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.026) 
              
2.  Probability of working full-time and receiving welfare      
  SIPP   0.002  0.005  0.003  0.008  0.008  0.004 
   (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
              
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l   0.007    -0.008   0.011  0.043  0.038  0.042 
  Fixed Effects    (0.021)    (0.023)    (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.029) 
              
3.  Probability of working part-time and receiving welfare      
  SIPP   0.017  0.022  0.023  -0.009  -0.010  -0.014 
   (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.016) 
              
 SIPP w/ Indiv'l  0.012    -0.004   -0.003  -0.001  -0.008   0.003 
   Fixed Effects  (0.021)     (0.022)    (0.023)   (0.016)   (0.015)    (0.015) 
Each cell represents the coefficient from a separate regression.  Specifications 1, 2, and 3 are 
detailed in Table 5. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Welfare Program Design, Florida, 1990 and 2000:
For a woman earning $7/hour, 6 months after entering employment from welfare 
1990
2000
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Welfare Program Design, Illinois, 1990 and 2000:
For a woman earning $7/hour, 6 months after entering employment from welfare 
1990
2000
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Welfare Program Design, Texas, 1990 and 2000:
For a woman earning $7/hour, 6 months after entering employment from welfare 
1990
2000






Welfare Benefits at 30 hours Per Week of Work in States, Grouped by Change in 




































Notes: Authors' calculations, 1984-2003. This is the annual average, across the first 12 months of work, of the expected 








Welfare Benefits at 40 hours Per Week of Work in States, Grouped by Change in 

































Notes: Authors' calculations, 1984-2003. This is the annual average, across the first 12 months of work, of the 
expected public assistance income received at 40 hours of work, assuming a constant wage ($7/hour) for a single 













 Share of Workers Among Low-Skilled Single Mothers, States Grouped by 







































Average Weekly Hours Worked Among Low-Skilled Single Mothers, States 

































Notes: Authors' tabulations of CPS ORG data.  Average weekly hours worked include zeroes (those not working).
Low-Change States
High-Change States
Middle-Change States 
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